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ABSTRACT
In Emotions, Values, and Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a 
sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in 
wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this 
paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet’s proposal.
Introduction
Christine Tappolet’s Emotions, Values, and Agency (Tappolet, 2017) provides a rich, 
provocative, and highly accessible defense of a perceptual theory of emotion. On 
her account, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties: to be 
disgusted by the maggot infested meat is, quite literally, to perceive the meat as 
disgusting—to see it as something to be rejected or avoided. While Tappolet’s core 
argument for her Perceptual Theory comes through the significant parallels she 
identifies between emotions and sensory perceptions, the proposal gets further 
development and support from her efforts to draw out the implications that it has 
for our understanding of a wide range of issues in value theory. For instance, she 
argues that her Perceptual Theory not only enriches our understanding of emotions’ 
tendency to prompt motivation and action, but also pushes us toward a novel, 
broadly sentimentalist account of value and moral responsibility. To this she adds a 
nuanced account of how emotions contribute positively to human agency. Tappolet 
also argues that understanding emotions as perceptions has important epistemo-
logical consequences: just as sensory perceptions can help us become aware of the 
external world and justify our associated beliefs about it, emotions can be sources 
of awareness and justification within the evaluative realm. The end result is a pow-
erful defense of a perceptual theory of emotions and its philosophical significance.
In what follows, we begin with a chapter-level overview of Emotions, Values, 
and Agency, focusing in particular on what we see as its most significant claims 
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and arguments (Section 1). We then move to raise three worries that focus on: 
Tappolet’s defense of her Perceptual Theory (Section 2), her argument that emo-
tions have only a contingent tie to motivation (Section 3), and the Sentimental 
Realism she develops as an alternative to existing neo-sentimentalist accounts of 
value (Section 4). We conclude our discussion with some more general obser-
vations about the significance of Tappolet’s proposal for existing debates in the 
philosophy of emotion and ethical theory (Section 5).
1. Tappolet’s neo-sentimentalist perceptual theory of emotion
Chapter 1 presents Tappolet’s core defense of her Perceptual Theory. In taking 
emotions to be perceptions, her proposal contrasts with theories that under-
stand emotions as a type of feeling (e.g., James, 1884), a form of judgment (e.g., 
Nussbaum, 2001), or a type of motivation (e.g., Scarantino, 2015). Her proposal 
also contrasts with other perceptual theories both in taking emotions to be, in 
the first place, perceptions of evaluative properties rather than, say, perceptions 
of changes in bodily states (e.g., Prinz, 2004) and in understanding the content of 
emotions to be non-conceptual rather than conceptually-laden construals (e.g., 
Roberts, 2013).
As Tappolet notes, her formulation of a perceptual account makes for a strong 
analogy with sensory perceptions. In fact, she sees the robustness of these affini-
ties as the principal support for her move to identify emotions with perceptions 
(pp. 19–24). To develop this, Tappolet highlights key parallels between emotions 
and sensory perceptions. For instance, both are conscious states with phenomenal 
properties—just as there’s a way it is like to see something as blue, there’s a way it 
is like to experience fear or disgust. Both types of experience are automatic (e.g., 
you cannot decide to fear a dog just as you cannot decide to see the sky as blue) 
and it’s difficult to directly change what you see or feel. Sensory perceptions and 
emotions are also “world-guided” in the sense that they’re caused by things in the 
world and both have content that can be evaluated as incorrect—things that aren’t 
blue can nonetheless look blue and things that aren’t funny can elicit amusement. 
Finally, both display a high degree of informational encapsulation and both are 
inferentially isolated in the sense that neither is involved in inferential networks.
But as Tappolet acknowledges, the analogy is imperfect in various ways. (i) 
Emotions, but not sensory perceptions, are causally dependent on their cognitive 
bases: in order to be afraid, you must see, hear, remember, or imagine the target 
of your fear (these causal sources being the “cognitive bases” of your fear). (ii) 
Unlike sensory perceptions, emotions are both more intimately tied to motivation 
and typically come with a positive or negative valence. (iii) Emotions also have a 
richer phenomenology (e.g., fear involves a cascade of physiological changes that 
do not occur in response to, for example, simply seeing a clock). And (iv) while 
sensory perceptions are transparent, emotions are not. Tappolet’s response to these 
disanalogies is twofold. First, she maintains that “there is nothing conceptually 
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wrong” with identifying emotions as perceptions in the face of differences like 
(i)–(iv). To this she adds that the disanalogies seem troubling only if one takes 
sensory perceptions to be the paradigm of what a perception is. But here she argues 
that we do better if we adopt a more liberal account—one that sees perception “as 
a kind of awareness of things and qualities … a form of openness to the world” 
(p. 29; see, e.g., McDowell, 1994).
While this is progress, a further difference still threatens the Perceptual Theory. 
Although both emotion and sensory perceptions can be assessed for incorrectness, 
only emotions allow for assessments of irrationality. Tappolet’s response is clever. 
As she sees it, this difference doesn’t show that emotions are not perceptions, but 
rather that emotion systems are more plastic than sensory systems. While there’s 
nothing we can do to keep from seeing the Müller-Lyer lines as different lengths, 
it is possible for us to overcome a recalcitrant fear of flying. As she puts it, “in 
contrast to the case of [an incorrect] sensory perception, there is some hope we 
can get rid of inappropriate emotions”—and this explains why only emotions can 
be irrational (p. 38).
The larger result of Tappolet’s examination of these disanalogies is a richer 
understanding of the sense in which she takes emotions to be perceptions: emo-
tions are malleable systems that help open us to the evaluative features of the 
world. The balance of the book further develops this idea.
In her second chapter, Tappolet investigates the connection between emotion 
and motivation in order to both lay foundation for her account of how emotions 
can contribute positively to human agency (Chapter 5) and address concerns that 
emotions’ robust tie to motivation undermines her Perceptual Theory. While the 
discussion takes the form of an extended examination of fear, the chapter ends by 
arguing that the lessons gleaned about fear extend to other emotions.
Tappolet begins by arguing against the thought—common among philosophers 
(e.g., Griffith, 1997) and psychologists (e.g., Frijda, 1986)—that fear is modular 
in the sense that it automatically generates a rigid set of fight-or-flight behaviors. 
If that thought—a view Tappolet dubs the Thesis of Motivational Modularity—is 
correct, then one might reasonably worry that the narrowness of the response will 
undermine fear’s ability to facilitate agency (at least outside of a small range of 
cases). But the Modularity Thesis is implausible: whatever truth it has as a claim 
about the danger-behavior of rodents and other non-human animals, it’s deeply 
inadequate as an account about our fear responses. While we sometimes engage 
in fight/flight behaviors in the face of danger, we also do much more—scared 
about being trapped in a burning building, one might run toward an exit; but 
one might be just as likely to look for a fire extinguisher or use one’s cell phone 
to call for help (p. 57).
While the problems with the Modularity Thesis indicate that human fears 
display a flexible connection to a range of motivations, they do not rule out the 
possibility that the two are necessarily connected. Along these lines psychologists 
like Gerald Clore and philosophers like Jesse Prinz have endorsed what Tappolet 
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calls the Desire Theory—an account that grants emotions lack the kind of rigid 
action tendencies presumed by the Modularity Thesis, but nonetheless sees emo-
tions as necessarily involving a motivational element—namely, a desire that exerts 
an emotion-specific influence on the individual’s subsequent decision-making. 
Fear, for instance, necessarily involves a desire that inclines one to avoid harm 
and loss (p. 59).
But the possibility of such a connection sits uncomfortably with the Perceptual 
Theory: not only do sensory perceptions fail to display this sort of essential con-
nection to motivation, but the possibility of such a tie also suggests—troublingly—
that fear is a mental state that’s at once motivational and representational—a 
“besire-like” state with both world-to-mind and mind-to-world directions of fit.1 
To rebut this proposal, Tappolet makes a case for what she calls “contemplative 
emotions”—emotions that do not involve any desire (p. 47). Building from Kendall 
Walton’s (1978) discussion of fearing fictions, Tappolet takes up the example of 
Charles who seems terrorized by the green slime monster in a horror movie but 
who nonetheless doesn’t flee or try to escape. On Tappolet’s analysis, Charles’ 
behavior is best explained as a case of contemplative fear—a situation where he 
feels fear but has no fear-related desire (say, to escape the slime). To think other-
wise, she argues, would require us to assume Charles was either irrational (e.g., 
he desires to escape the dangerous slime even though he believes it doesn’t exist) 
or experiencing conflicting desires (e.g., to escape and to stay) despite showing no 
signs of being torn between these options (pp. 64–65). But if contemplative fears 
like Charles’ are possible, then “it is clear that desires are not essential ingredients, 
or parts, of the emotion of fear as such” (p. 66).
Tappolet’s resulting theory of motivation, then, is one on which emotions are 
very closely, but not essentially, tied to motivation—a conclusion that aids the 
defense of her Perceptual Theory: if emotions are only contingently tied to moti-
vation, then we needn’t be concerned either that they are problematically disan-
alogous to sensory perceptions or that they require us to countenance besire-like 
mental states.
In Chapter 3, Tappolet defends a neo-sentimentalist account of the connection 
between emotion and value. But, sensitive to familiar worries about the viabil-
ity of existing neo-sentimentalist proposals, she offers a novel alternative—what 
she calls Sentimental Realism. Much of the chapter thus aims to draw out the 
superiority of Sentimental Realism as an account of value and to show how it 
follows naturally from her Perceptual Theory. Neo-sentimentalist proposals offer 
response-dependent accounts of value that analyze values in terms of the appro-
priateness of the associated emotional responses. The core proposal takes the 
form of biconditionals like:
(S)  x is shameful (disgusting, amusing…) if and only if it is appropriate to feel shame 
(disgust, amusement…) toward x.
As often developed, neo-sentimentalists elaborate (S) in two ways. First, they 
endorse a normative understanding of ‘appropriate’ where (roughly) if x is 
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shameful, then one has (some) reason to feel shame toward it. Second, they pro-
pose (S) as an account for both value concepts (the shameful) and value properties 
(being shameful).
But as Tappolet notes, these elaborations bring trouble, the most significant of 
which is the familiar Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. If one’s shameful behavior 
entails that one has a reason to feel shame, then we need an account of the kind of 
reason this is. In particular, we need a rendering of (S) on which the reasons one 
has to feel shame result from the shamefulness of the behavior, not (say) its moral 
or prudential features. But existing neo-sentimentalist proposals seem unable to 
do this (pp. 95–98). Moreover, since (S) is standardly taken to be an account of 
both value concepts and properties, advocates of the normative rendering of (S) 
have little to work with beyond appeals to the emotional response itself; thus they 
appear unequipped to give a substantive, non-circular explanation of the relevant 
kind of reason (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000).
Much of the appeal of Tappolet’s alternative lies in its ability to avoid prob-
lems like these. Her Sentimental Realism differs from standard neo-sentimentalist 
proposals in two ways. First, it rejects the normative reading of ‘appropriate’ in 
(S). On her “representational” alternative, for you to judge that your behavior is 
shameful is not to make a claim about the reasons you have to feel shame. Rather, 
it’s to claim that the evaluative content of the emotion “is correct, or accurate, 
from an epistemic point of view” (p. 87): your behavior is as your shame presents 
it to be. Second, Tappolet’s proposal is “realist” in the sense that while it takes 
value concepts to be response-dependent, the associated properties are not—they 
are “fully objective” (pp. xiii, 116). Put another way, Sentimental Realism entails 
that while we cannot think or make judgments about shameful things unless 
we have experienced shame, things can be shameful regardless of our ability to 
experience shame.2
With these distinguishing features in hand, Tappolet argues that the rep-
resentational aspect of her Sentimental Realism allows her to easily avoid the 
Wrong Kinds of Reason Problem: because “appropriateness” is not normative on 
her account, the shamefulness of your behavior doesn’t generate reasons, much 
less wrong reasons (pp. 95–96). Tappolet also argues that the realist aspect of 
her theory allows her to avoid the circularity issues that threaten other forms of 
sentimentalism. As we noted above, if judgments about what’s shameful are to 
be assessed in terms of the appropriateness of feelings of shame (as (S) states), 
then—if we’re to avoid circularity—we need a way of understanding when shame 
is appropriate that doesn’t appeal to judgments about what’s shameful. But notice: 
since value properties are not response dependent on Tappolet’s account, she has 
more resources to draw on to avoid circularity. In particular, she argues that since 
shamefulness (the property) is response-independent, we can make the defeasible 
assumption that shame (the emotion) aims to track this objective value property.3 
Then, taking a cue from Philip Pettit (1991, pp. 600–603), she adds that we can 
identify the appropriate instances of shame as those that “survive our discounting 
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practice[s]” (p. 102). As Tappolet explains, “when we want to determine whether 
something should count as a defeater, we have to look to our shared practices of 
discounting certain conditions as likely to interfere with our responses, a practice 
that aims at making sense of intrapersonal, but also interpersonal, discrepancies” 
(p. 172; also 101–102). Thus, we might deem the shame assessments of someone 
on medication inappropriate on the grounds that we have a practice of taking 
medication of that sort to cloud evaluation. Though Tappolet grants this frame-
work is quite general, she maintains it’s sufficient to show that unlike normative 
neo-sentimentalism, her account is not circular or trivial. These results are impres-
sive. Not only does the representational aspect of Tappolet’s Sentimental Realism 
fit nicely with her Perceptual Thesis, but the richness of the overall proposal does 
much to advance our understanding of what a viable neo-sentimentalist account 
of value might look like.
Chapter 4 extends the discussion of emotions’ role in value theory by examin-
ing their relevance for our understanding of moral responsibility. In particular, 
Tappolet’s project is two-fold. First, she begins by assessing the prospects for a 
neo-sentimentalist account of the Strawsonian idea that to be morally responsible 
is to be a fitting target of reactive attitudes like guilt, resentment, and gratitude. 
Second, given the troubles she uncovers for neo-sentimentalist Strawsonians, 
Tappolet draws on her Sentimental Realism to develop an alternative account of 
the relationship between moral responsibility and reactive attitudes.
Tappolet’s critical project begins with what she calls the constitutive interpre-
tation of Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). On this account, to be 
morally responsible just is to be a fitting target of the reactive attitudes. From this 
starting place, Tappolet observes that tying moral responsibility to these fitting 
emotions invites a neo-sentimentalist account of the property of being morally 
responsible which, in turn, suggests that the concept of moral responsibility should 
also be given a neo-sentimentalist analysis (pp. 130–131). The upshot, then, is that 
the constitutive interpretation appears to commit one to understanding “moral 
responsibility” as a response-dependent concept.
While extending a neo-sentimentalist account of value to the domain of moral 
responsibility would seem to square with the idea that the normative domains 
should be given a unified analysis, Tappolet disagrees. The “Asymmetry Problem” 
provides reason to think there are important structural and functional differences 
between responsibility and value—differences that undermine the prospects of a 
neo-sentimentalist account of (the concept of) moral responsibility.
First, consider the structural asymmetries between value and responsibility. 
With regard to value, there’s a tight connection between emotions and the asso-
ciated value concepts and properties. Not only do we find lexical connections 
between emotion terms (“shame,” “disgust”) and the associated concepts (the 
shameful, the disgusting), but emotions and their associated values also display 
telling affinities: both come in degrees, have (positive/negative) valence, and are 
typically paired with a polar opposite (e.g., pride and shame, joy and sadness). By 
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contrast, there’s no lexical connection between responsibility and reactive attitude 
labels like “shame” and “resentment” (p. 136). And although Tappolet allows that 
there might be a way to makes sense of responsibility as gradable (though she’s 
skeptical), she maintains there’s little support for the other structural features: 
while particular reactive attitudes are valenced, moral responsibility itself is not. 
Similarly with regard to the existence of polar opposites (p. 140).
Turning to functional asymmetries, Tappolet notes that value judgments dis-
play both a non-cognitive dimension, given their intimate tie to motivation, and 
a cognitive dimension, insofar as they purport to describe the evaluative features 
of agents, actions, and objects—a combination that a neo-sentimentalist account 
appears well positioned to explain (pp. 84, 118–119, 142–144). However, while 
judgments of responsibility are like value judgments with regard to their cog-
nitive dimension, Tappolet argues that it’s much less clear that they share the 
non-cognitive tie to motivation: while deeming myself to be responsible for the 
accident might motivate me to apologize, it seems implausible to think that I’d 
be practically irrational were I to lack such a motivation. But if that’s right, then 
though responsibility judgments may incline us to have certain motivations, this 
connection is significantly weaker than is typically associated with the non-cogni-
tive dimension of value judgments—that is, failing to be motivated doesn’t entail 
practical irrationality (Smith, 1994). Yet once we see that responsibility judgments 
are (principally) cognitive phenomena, the second attraction of a neo-sentimen-
talist account fades: if there isn’t a robust non-cognitive dimension to responsi-
bility judgments, then (unlike the case of value judgments) there’s nothing for a 
neo-sentimentalist account to reconcile.4
The Asymmetry Problem might suggest that reactive attitudes are only con-
tingently related to moral responsibility. But to accept this, Tappolet maintains, 
would be a mistake: we would be unable to preserve the intuition that guilt, 
resentment, gratitude, and the like are appropriate responses to the moral fea-
tures of our actions and characters. Thus, the second part of Chapter 4 develops 
a novel neo-sentimentalist proposal that takes emotions and responsibility to 
be essentially—but indirectly—related. More specifically, while standard neo- 
sentimentalist proposals seek to secure a constitutive connection between the 
reactive attitudes and moral responsibility, on Tappolet’s alternative proposal, 
emotions are tied to responsibility by way of the morally valuable features of one’s 
actions. So, for instance, the gratitude I feel toward you for helping me is fitting, 
not because of some constitutive tie between my gratitude and your responsibility, 
but rather because (i) you helped me and (ii) the fact that your assistance was 
morally valuable reflects well on you. Importantly, in order for your assistance 
to reflect well on you, you must be responsible for it. So while the connection 
between my gratitude and your responsibility comes indirectly via the moral 
value that your assistance has, it’s not a contingent tie: your responsibility for the 
action is essential to its reflecting well on you and so to the appropriateness of 
my gratitude (pp. 152–153). Thus, we can allow that “moral responsibility” isn’t 
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response dependent, while still maintaining that it has an essential connection to 
(fitting) reactive attitudes.
In her last chapter, Tappolet turns to agency. Her aim is to show that emotions 
can—and often do—contribute positively to autonomous action. Not only do 
emotions track practical reasons (sometimes more accurately than the conclusions 
we come to through deliberation), but they can also be responsive to reasons in 
the ways they need to be to facilitate autonomous agency.
Tappolet’s thesis that emotions track practical reasons follows smoothly from 
the combination of her Perceptual Theory given the (plausible) assumption that 
the instantiation of an evaluative property constitutes a (pro tanto) reason: since 
emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties, they’re perceptions of practical 
reasons. Thus, emotions can “track” reasons in the sense that they can inform us 
of the reasons we have; and their ability to do this is independent of the beliefs, 
deliberations, and judgments we make about our reasons (pp. 164–166). Moreover, 
if emotions provide this type of independent and privileged access to evaluative 
properties, then they’re central to our ability to be aware of the reasons we have 
and so crucial to the capacities that undergird human agency (p. 167).
To help develop this line, Tappolet points to cases where emotions appear to 
better track reasons than do our associated considered judgments. Instances of 
recalcitrance, for example, can be cases where (say) our fear of the black widow 
better tracks our reasons for action than does our judgment that the little spider is 
harmless. Akratic action provides another example. Huck Finn’s emotional resist-
ance to turning Jim over to the slave hunters better tracks his reasons than does 
his considered judgment that it’s wrong for him to harbor a slave. In particular, 
Huck’s judgment neglects considerations—e.g., that Jim is a good friend in need 
of help—that his emotions are sensitive to (pp. 179–180).
But even if emotions, and actions based on them, can track reasons, do they 
exhibit the reasons-responsiveness that’s essential to agency? Tappolet maintains 
they can. On her account, reasons-responsiveness needn’t involve conscious delib-
eration as many Rationalists maintain. Rather, one can respond to reasons by 
simply acting on emotions so long as one’s emotions are undergirded by well-
tuned epistemic and practical habits—what Tappolet calls “agential virtues.” More 
specifically, the idea here is that emotions are reasons-responsive to the extent that 
they’re the upshot of a process of reflective self-monitoring whereby an agent is 
“disposed to intervene and take control if she has reason to distrust her emotion” 
(p. 176; also Jones, 2003). So I demonstrate reasons-responsiveness in acting on 
my anger just in case I have no reason to think my ire is misplaced and, were it 
reasonable for me to think my anger was misfiring, I would not act on it. Given 
this account of how emotions can be reason-responsive, Tappolet concludes the 
chapter by showing how her proposal allows that agents acting on emotions can 
be seen as acting autonomously, whether autonomy is defined in terms of either 
a capacity for critical reflection or particular cares/motivations (pp. 190–194).
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All told, Tappolet provides one of—if not the—most worked out defenses of 
the Perceptual Theory and its relevance for a range of debates regarding moral 
epistemology, the nature of value and moral responsibility, and our understanding 
of rational agency. With our overview complete, we turn to raise three worries 
before concluding with some general remarks about what Tappolet’s proposal 
tells us about the nature of emotions and their relevance to issues in value theory.
2. A first worry: The analogy argument
As we have seen, the analogy argument of Chapter 1 provides crucial support for 
Tappolet’s Perceptual Theory. But given the differences she acknowledges between 
emotions and sensory experiences, there’s reason to be concerned that the anal-
ogy cannot do the metaphysical and epistemological work she wants—namely, 
showing that emotions are a kind of perception and that they can provide reasons 
for belief.
First, consider the identity claim. Recall that though Tappolet grants that emo-
tions are unlike sensory perceptions in several respects—for example, they have 
an intimate connection with motivation, are (typically) valenced, and require 
cognitive bases—she maintains there’s no conceptual difficulty in identifying them 
as perceptions. But while we can agree that there isn’t an analytic connection here, 
it’s also true that the more differences we find between emotions and paradig-
matic forms of perception, the less support the analogy argument provides for 
the claim that emotions are perceptions. Importantly, it’s not just the number of 
disanalogies that’s worrisome. The ways in which emotions differ from sensory 
perceptions also brings trouble: they suggest that emotions and perceptions are 
different kinds of mental states.
To see this, let’s first distinguish perceptual states from intentional states more 
generally. In particular, notice that while all perceptual states are intentional in the 
sense of having content or “aboutness,” not all intentional states are perceptions—
though desires, wishes, intentions, and hopes all have content, they aren’t percep-
tual states. But if having content is not what’s characteristic of being a perceptual 
state, then what is? At least part of the answer seems to lie in how perceptual states 
make use of the content they have: perceptual states are intentional states that play 
a distinctive role in our mental economy—one that differs from the role played 
by non-perceptual intentional states like desires and wishes. More specifically, 
perceptions are states that use intentional content to inform the perceiver about 
(external) objects and their properties. By contrast, desires and intentions use their 
content to give shape to how we respond, given our understanding of the world.
Now here’s the trouble: the features that emotions have that make them disan-
alogous to sensory perceptions suggest that, though they’re intentional states, 
they do more than merely inform. In particular, we’ve seen that unlike sensory 
perceptions, typical emotional episodes (i) are experienced as valenced, hedon-
ically-toned phenomena, (ii) have an intimate connection to motivation/action, 
10   C. KURTH ET AL.
and (iii) are assessed not just for accuracy, but also rationality. But if emotions 
have features indicative of a mental state that does more than just inform, then it 
seems odd to equate them with perceptions. After all, if a mental state’s function 
is merely to inform, why would it have features like (i)–(iii)—features that are 
characteristic of a state that functions to influence how one responds to the way 
the world is?5
Ultimately, Tappolet may not be all that bothered by this. Her willingness to 
accept that emotions might just be “quasi-perceptions” (pp. 30–31) suggests the 
identity claim is less significant to her account than is the work that emotions can 
do given the parallels they have with sensory perceptions. On this front, recall that 
an important implication Tappolet sees as following from her Perceptual Theory 
is epistemological. As she explains, “on the basis of the Perceptual Account I have 
defended, it appears plausible that emotions have an epistemic function that is 
comparable to that of sensory perception” (p. 168). So Tappolet could argue that 
even if features (i)–(iii) cause trouble for the identity claim, they don’t prevent 
emotions from playing a perception-like epistemic role. This would be significant, 
since emotions’ epistemological role is central to her account of their relevance 
for agency in Chapter 5.
But as others have noted, the claim that emotions are epistemically on par 
with sensory perceptions is hard to reconcile with the fact that emotions, but not 
sensory perceptions, require cognitive bases (e.g., Brady, 2013, Chapter 4; Deonna 
& Teroni, 2012, Chapter 6). We can draw this out by considering two claims that 
Tappolet appears to accept:
(1)  Justification. Emotions, like sensory perceptions, are first-hand sources 
of reasons for belief (pp. 42–44).
(2)  Access. Emotions are dependent on their cognitive bases in a way that 
sensory perceptions are not; while vision can give us direct access to 
what we see, emotions only provide indirect access to their objects: one’s 
fear of the dog must come by way of some other mental state/act—for 
example, seeing or imagining the dog (pp. 22, 25).
But it’s unclear Tappolet can endorse both claims. Though the difficulty can be 
spelled out in different ways, here’s one version. In the case of sensory perception, 
it’s (in part) the fact that my seeing the box on the table gives me direct access 
to the box and its properties that explains why my visual perception provides 
“first-hand” justification for my belief that the box is on the table. But given (2), 
emotions only give indirect access to their objects. So how is (1) possible—how 
can emotions provide justification in the same way that vision does?
Tappolet’s response, at least as we understand it, is to challenge (2): only part 
of an emotion’s content comes indirectly.6 More specifically, while she agrees that 
emotions require cognitive bases, she maintains that these cognitive bases are 
only responsible for part of emotions’ content—the particular object, but not the 
formal object (pp. 42–44, 169 footnote 14; cf., Pelser, 2014). The idea seems to be 
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this. Access to the particular object of an emotion is indirect—in order for my fear 
to be about the dog (its particular object or target), my access must come by way 
of seeing or imagining the dog. But the dog’s fearsomeness (its formal object or 
evaluative property) is something I have direct access to. Thus, the tension between 
(1) and (2) dissolves: though emotions require cognitive bases for access to their 
particular objects, access to—and so justification regarding—formal objects is, 
like sensory perception, direct.
The proposal is provocative, but we’re worried about its complexity. On 
Tappolet’s account, the content of my fear of the dog—my seeing the dog as fear-
some—comes through two routes: I get the dog content indirectly by way of seeing 
the dog and I get the content about the dog’s evaluative properties—its fearsome-
ness—directly. But what explains this? Why is it that though fear’s access to the 
dog must be indirect, its access to the fearsomeness needn’t be? To drive home 
the difficulty of this challenge, notice that other features of Tappolet’s view rule 
out some potentially appealing ways of explaining these different modes of access. 
For instance, her commitment to understanding the content of emotions to be 
non-conceptual (pp. 17–18, cf., 42–44) prevents her from adopting elements of 
Robert Roberts’ perceptual proposal. On his account, emotions are ways of directly 
seeing—conceptually construing—an object’s evaluative features: in fearing the 
dog, I see the dog as fearsome by way of engaging evaluative concepts to construe 
its sharp teeth and aggressive posture in a normatively-loaded way—as dangerous 
to me (2013, pp. 50–53). An option more in line with Tappolet’s commitments 
would be an appeal to supervieneince (pp. 39–40): because the evaluative super-
venes on the non-evaluative, though fear’s access to both the dog and the dog’s 
non-evaluative properties (sharp teeth, aggressive posture) is indirect, fear has 
direct access to the dog’s fearsomeness. However, while this supervenience strat-
egy is intriguing, we find it hard to assess without an understanding of the nature 
of this “because”—how is it that facts about supervenience explain facts about 
differences in our epistemic access? Thus, while we’re open to the possibility that 
Tappolet can answer this explanatory challenge, we have trouble seeing how the 
story might go. As such, we’re worried about the plausibility of the epistemological 
role her Perceptual Theory suggests emotions have.
3. A second worry: Motivation and contemplative emotions
An important line of defense for Tappolet’s Perceptual Theory is the case she makes 
against the common idea that emotion and motivation are necessarily connected. 
Her core critical argument, recall, is her analysis of the Charles example: since 
his fear of the green slime is merely contemplative (that is, it lacks a fear-related 
motivation), we have a counterexample to the claim that emotions have a neces-
sary tie to motivation. But we’re not convinced that understanding Charles’ fear 
as contemplative is the best way make sense of the example.
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First, in order for Tappolet’s example of contemplative fear to hold up, Charles 
must actually be afraid. In this vein, Tappolet dismisses Walton’s conclusion that 
Charles is not experiencing fear because he does not believe he’s in danger. As 
she notes, Walton’s verdict follows only given his endorsement of the (dubious) 
Judgmentalist Theory of emotion whereby being afraid requires the belief that one 
is in danger (p. 64; Walton, 1978, pp. 6–7). But we needn’t presume Judgmentalism 
in order to have doubts about whether Charles is afraid. For instance, given 
Walton’s description of the case, Charles’s response might be nothing more than 
the combination of a heightened state of arousal as he watches the slime’s relentless 
destruction and startle when the slime picks up speed and makes a turn toward 
him (cf., Robinson, 1995). If that’s plausible, then there’s no reason to think Charles 
is experiencing fear—much less contemplative fear.
Setting the above aside, let’s follow Tappolet in supposing both that Charles is 
afraid and that if his fear involves motivation, it comes by way of a fear-related 
desire.7 To show that Charles’ fear is desire (and so motivation) free, Tappolet 
considers what she sees as the two best reasons for thinking otherwise. The first 
possibility is that while Charles has a fear-related desire, he also has a stronger, 
conflicting desire (say, to watch the movie) that wins out. In response, Tappolet 
argues that
The suggestion that there is a conflict of desire, which could possibly require some 
deliberation, does not seem to fit Charles’ case. Charles seems far from torn between 
a desire to watch the film and a desire to run away. Also, one wonders how it could be 
that his desire to watch the film could be stronger than his desire to avoid a horrible 
death. (pp. 64–65)
But there are three reasons to be suspicious of this reply. First, the suggestion 
that if Charles had conflicting desires, he would (likely) be engaged in delibera-
tion to work them out does not fit with Tappolet’s preferred account of practical 
reasoning. As we’ve seen (Section 1), she maintains the reasons we act on can 
be controlled through habits of self-monitoring that needn’t engage delibera-
tion when the processes that provide us with access to reasons (e.g., emotions) 
give conflicting prescriptions (p. 182; cf., p. 59). Thus, we needn’t be bothered by 
Charles’ lack of deliberation.
Second, Tappolet’s reply assumes that if Charles’ desire to watch the movie wins 
out over his fear-related desire, the two must be in “conflict” such that he’s “torn” 
about which to go with: it’s because he displays no sign of conflict that Tappolet 
deems the two-desires proposal implausible. But drawing a lesson from Andrea 
Scarantino’s motivational theory of emotion (2015), we could understand our 
motivational system as a set of hierarchically arranged desires.8 On this proposal, 
Charles’ desires occupy different spots in the hierarchy. Because his desire to watch 
the movie is higher in the queue, it “wins out” and drives his behavior. But since his 
desires reside at different “levels,” they aren’t really in conflict. So (pace Tappolet), 
we can explain why Charles isn’t torn between his two desires.
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Finally, with regard to Tappolet’s contention that it’s hard to make sense of how 
a desire to avoid death could be weaker than a desire to watch the film, we should 
recall her observation that there’s much more to fear behavior than just the prover-
bial fight/flight response (pp. 54–56). In particular, Charles’ fear might manifest as 
a sophisticated freeze response, not flight. If so, then the puzzle dissolves: though 
Charles’ desires have different goals (enjoy the film vs. avoid death), their means to 
securing these goals are the same—namely, staying put. Taken together, this trio of 
concerns suggests Tappolet’s dismissal of the two-desires explanation is too hasty.
The second defense of the claim that Charles’ fear is accompanied by a desire 
that Tappolet considers is one that takes Charles’ belief that the slime is fictional 
to interfere with his fear-related desire—this interference then explains why he 
doesn’t flee. Tappolet finds this suggestion implausible since it requires us to attrib-
ute an “utterly irrational” belief-desire combination to Charles—namely, a desire 
to escape a threat he believes to be fake (p. 65). While we agree that there is a 
sense in which Charles’ belief-desire combination is irrational, we’re unsure that 
it’s problematic. After all, part of the appeal of horror movies, part of the reason 
we go to these films in the first place, seems to be that because we recognize these 
movies are fiction, we see them as providing a safe way to experience “danger”—
they provide us with a way to elicit and so learn to manage our feeling of terror 
and our desire to escape (see Walthers, 2004 for an argument of this sort). If that’s 
right, then the proposal Tappolet rejects may actually be the best way to make 
sense of Charles’ behavior.
Stepping back, our concerns about Tappolet’s rendering of the Charles case 
suggest her argument for contemplative fear falls short. Given fear’s status as a 
paradigmatic emotion, this brings a cost to her Perceptual Theory and the anal-
ogy argument she uses to defend it. Tappolet might seek to contain the dam-
age by emphasizing that what’s true of one emotion may not be true of others 
(pp. 5, 49): even if fear bears an essential connection to motivation, it’s doubtful 
that emotions like nostalgia or contentment also do. However, while going this way 
might vindicate the more general claim that emotions as a class aren’t essentially 
motivating, we’re uncertain how much protection this buys—much will depend 
on whether other paradigmatic emotions also have a necessary tie to motivation.
4. A final worry: Sentimental realism and evaluative disagreement
We’ve noted how Tappolet’s Perceptual Theory lends itself to a distinctive form of 
neo-sentimentalism, one whose representational and realist elements provide new 
resources that help her account avoid difficulties that beset traditional, normative 
neo-sentimentalist proposals. Granting that Tappolet’s Sentimental Realism has 
these advantages, we believe it has trouble offering a plausible account of evaluative 
disagreement. This, in turn, raises questions about whether Sentimental Realism 
ultimately offers a better account of value.
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To get started, consider the Peruvian food cuy—cooked guinea pig, often served 
with the limbs and head still attached. Many in the U.S. would find their stomach 
turning at such a meal, but it’s considered a delicious treat in Peru. In light of this, 
it seems that someone from the U.S. could disagree with a Peruvian about whether 
the cuy before them is disgusting. A viable neo-sentimentalist proposal needs to 
be able to account for evaluative disagreement like this. In particular, we want an 
account that not only captures these diners as genuinely disagreeing about the 
cuy, but that also delivers a plausible explanation of what they’re disagreeing about 
and so what resolving the disagreement would involve.
According to Tappolet’s Sentimental Realism, the property of being disgusting 
is response-independent. So there’s an objective fact of the matter about whether 
cuy is disgusting and this means the diners’ disagreement is about whether cuy 
has this property. On this front, one of them is mistaken, and determining who 
is—resolving the disagreement—is thus a matter of figuring out whether the U.S. 
diner’s disgust is appropriate: does it accurately represent the (response-inde-
pendent) evaluative properties of the cuy?9 But Tappolet’s proposal allows her 
to say more. In particular, recall that on her account, assessments about whether 
an emotional response accurately represents the evaluative property it aims to 
track are a matter of determining whether the response coheres with our practice 
of “discounting” evaluative judgments made under conditions that are likely to 
interfere with the emotions they’re based on. So, for instance, did the U.S. diner 
deem the cuy disgusting because he tasted it shortly after brushing his teeth? 
If so, then on Tappolet’s account, we have reason to think it’s his disgust which 
misrepresents—it’s his assessment, not the Peruvian’s, that’s mistaken.
As an account of evaluative disagreement, we have two concerns. First, not all 
evaluative disagreement seems plausibly understood as disagreement that—at 
bottom—concerns whether someone’s emotion-based judgment survives our dis-
counting practices. Consider: suppose the U.S. diner points to the oozing grease 
and the charred feet of the cuy as evidence of its disgustingness; suppose further 
that the Peruvian rejects this: he thinks the grease and the charring are what 
give the cuy its delectable, crispy richness. Such an exchange seems less about 
discounting practices and more about what makes the cuy disgusting—or not. 
Tappolet might reply that we don’t see the relevance of discounting practices in 
this exchange because we haven’t pushed far enough: at its core, the Peruvian’s 
response amounts to a claim that there’s something about the conditions from 
which the U.S. diner is basing his decision that lead his disgust to misrepresent 
the cuy.
We’re suspicious of this line of response—it seems to over-intellectualize the 
exchange between the diners. But rather than pursue this further, we’ll move to 
our second concern. It seems perfectly possible for the Peruvian and U.S. diners 
to agree on what the relevant discounting practices are, to agree that they have 
not been violated, but nonetheless disagree about whether the cuy is disgusting. 
If that’s right, it suggests that the question of whether the cuy is disgusting is not 
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best understood descriptively—does the cuy have the objective property of being 
disgusting?—but rather normatively: does the cuy merit disgust—ought one be 
disgusted by it? But, notice, to say all this is just to conclude that evaluative dis-
agreement is better explained by normative neo-sentimentalism than Tappolet’s 
alternative.
These observations about evaluative disagreement reveal important limita-
tions in Tappolet’s account. But we’re unsure whether they tell decisively against 
her Sentimental Realism—as she’s shown, normative neo-sentimentalism faces 
significant problems of its own. Rather the lesson, we believe, is that the debate 
between these forms of sentimentalism will turn on questions about how impor-
tant one takes making sense of evaluative disagreement to be and what resources 
one thinks the normative neo-sentimentalist has to address the Wrong Kinds of 
Reasons Problem.
5. Conclusion: Prospects and perils for perceptual theories of emotion
Though we’ve just raised a set of worries about Tappolet’s account, one of the cen-
tral virtues of her book is that it highlights why the question of whether emotions 
are perceptions matters. In this vein, we close with three observations about how 
Emotions, Values, and Agency informs recent trends in research at the intersection 
of emotion and value theory.
(1) Epistemology. Perceptual theorists like Tappolet take emotions to be sources 
of justification. But given that the analogy between emotion and sensory percep-
tion is imperfect, are the two really on a par with regard to their epistemic import? 
As we saw, Tappolet maintains that, given the ways in which emotions are like 
sensory perceptions, they have what it takes to be sources of justification. But 
suspicions are likely to linger until more is said. What are the relevant features of 
emotions that allow them to function as more than mere proxies for the (sensory, 
memory, etc.) processes that do the actual epistemic work? How do these features 
provide justification, and in what sense does the resulting proposal still count as 
perceptual?
(2) Neo-sentimentalism. A provocative move in Tappolet’s book is the thought 
that her Perceptual Theory points to a better neo-sentimentalist account of value. 
But if our critical observations are on point, the marriage is an uneasy one. Tappolet’s 
proposal pushes us to a form of sentimentalism that’s both representational and 
realist. But this combination sits uncomfortably with traditional arguments for 
neo-sentimentalism—particularly, those that emphasize neo-sentimentalism’s 
ability to make sense of evaluative disagreement and (so) its ability to capture 
the role that our emotions (and our assessments of our emotional responses) 
play in regulating our evaluative judgments (e.g., D’Arms, 2005; Wiggins, 1987). 
We’ve already made some suggestions regarding what adjudicating these debates 
will involve (Section 5). Here, we want to add that this intra-sentimentalist debate 
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raises important questions about why one should be interested in a sentimentalist 
account in the first place.
(3) Agency. The arguments of Chapter 5 add to our understanding of how 
emotions can contribute positively to human agency. But Tappolet’s repeated—
and, in our mind, correct—observation that what’s true of one emotion may not 
be true of others raises questions about how well this “pro-emotion” conclusion 
holds up once we start looking at particular emotions and not just emotion as a 
class. If recent work on disgust (e.g., Kelly, 2011; Plakias, 2013) and anxiety (e.g., 
Kurth, 2015, 2016; Summers & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015) is any guide, there won’t 
be a simple answer. Rather, whether an emotion facilitates agency will depend on 
which emotion we’re considering and what dimension of agency we’re focused 
on (moral, practical, etc.).
Notes
1.  For concerns along these lines, see Smith (1994) and Roberts (2013); for a contrary 
view, see Scarantino (2015).
2.  While Tappolet’s preferred account of this “objectivity” is robust realism, she 
allows that her basic proposal is compatible with error-theoretic and constructivist 
renderings (pp. 116–117).
3.  Tappolet defends this “tracking” claim in Chapter 5.
4.  Though we won’t pursue the matter, it’s worth pausing to ask how well this argument—
with its reliance on there being a robust connection between emotions and 
motivation—fits with the Chapter 2 conclusion that emotions are only contingently 
tied to motivation. Cf., Tappolet’s discussion at page 118.
5.  At this point Tappolet might reply that the force of the argument in the text fades once 
we move away from an understanding of “perception” that takes sensory perceptions 
as the paradigm and instead adopt a more liberal understanding that sees perception 
“as a kind of awareness of things and qualities … a form of openness to the world” 
(p. 29). But this move arguably just trades one set of concerns for another. We can 
agree that if perception is understood metaphorically—an “openness to the world”—
then emotions count as perceptions. But unless more is said to flesh out the metaphor, 
we must also acknowledge that things like feelings of neuropathic pain, hunger, 
perhaps even cogito-style thoughts (e.g., “I’m now thinking of aluminum” [Burge, 
1996]), have equal claim to being perceptions—for they too provide awareness of 
things and qualities. To our mind, that is an odd result.
6.  Unpacking Tappolet’s argument is a bit challenging since, for dialectical reasons, 
her discussion of emotions’ epistemic role is spread over several parts of the book—
principally, Chapters 1.6 and 5.2.
7.  Recall that Tappolet is working within the framework of a “Desire Theory” which 
takes the motivational dimension of emotion to be grounded in desires.
8.  As far as we can tell, one can accept Scarantino’s hierarchical model of our motivational 
system without also endorsing his (more controversial) motivational theory of 
emotion.
9.  Here we follow Tappolet’s preferred rendering of the realist dimension of her 
sentimentalism: the realism is a robust realism that takes evaluative properties to be 
objective, non-relational properties (p. 116). Since her account is officially neutral 
on how “realism” should be understood, one could opt for a constructivist proposal 
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that makes disgustingness a person/culture relative property. Because going this way 
would allow that the US and Peruvian diners aren’t really disagreeing, we set this 
possibility aside.
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